

DECISION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CSC Docket No. 2023-1653
OAL Docket No. CSV 06917-24

The appeal of Chinwe Ugorji, Security Guard, Newark School District, removal, effective January 17, 2023, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Susana E. Guerrero (ALJ), who rendered her initial decision on June 16, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

The Commission makes the following comments. There is no serious dispute as to the misconduct alleged. The only issue to be resolved is the proper penalty to be imposed. In her initial decision, the ALJ found the following:

Here, the District seeks to bypass progressive discipline and terminate Ugorji for the events of November 18, 2022. While I agree that the offenses here are significant in that Ugorji failed to perform his basic duties as a security guard and that this resulted in the theft of one of the District's vehicles, I am not persuaded that the misconduct here is sufficiently severe to warrant termination, particularly considering the fact that Ugorji had been employed by the District for nearly twenty-five years without any prior discipline. Consequently, I **CONCLUDE** that the penalty of termination proposed by the District is excessive, and that a long-term suspension is a more appropriate penalty. There is no evidence that Ugorji knowingly permitted the intruder access to the lot or truck, and his lengthy service to the District without any prior discipline whatsoever is also a significant consideration in determining

an appropriate penalty. Given these considerations, together with the nature of the sustained charges, the absence of any reasonable explanation for failing to perform his duties, and Ugorji's refusal to take any responsibility for these failures, I **CONCLUDE** that a more appropriate penalty is a six-month suspension.

Regarding the penalty, similar to its assessment of the charges, the Commission's review of the penalty is *de novo*. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. *West New York v. Bock*, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant's offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee's prior record. *George v. North Princeton Developmental Center*, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual's disciplinary history. *See Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a "fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question." Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. *See Carter v. Bordentown*, 191 N.J. 474 (2007).

The appointing authority argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's recommended reduction in penalty is inappropriate given the egregious misconduct demonstrated by the appellant. While the Commission agrees that the appellant's misconduct was wholly inappropriate, as indicated above by the ALJ, the appellant was a near 25-year employee with no previous discipline. While his misconduct was seriously negligent, given his prior record of service, application of progressive discipline and a six-month suspension, the longest suspension permitted under Civil Service law and rules, should serve to sufficiently penalize the appellant as well as remind him that any future misconduct will likely result in his removal from employment. In making this determination, the Commission notes that it is not minimizing the appellant's seriously negligent dereliction of his primary duties. However, given his record, the Commission cannot find that dereliction so serious to bypass progressive discipline in this matter. Accordingly, it finds that the six-month suspension recommended by the ALJ is appropriate.

Since the removal has been modified, the appellant is entitled to be reinstated to his position with mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10 from six-months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay until the date he is reinstated.

However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a) provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in a disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges. *See Johnny*

Walcott v. City of Plainfield, 282 N.J. Super. 121,128 (App. Div. 1995); *In the Matter of Robert Dean* (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); *In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino* (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). Thus, where, as here, a penalty is modified but charges are sustained and major discipline is imposed, counsel fees must be denied since the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division's decision, *Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections*, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission's decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved. In the interim, as the court states in *Phillips, supra*, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the appellant to his permanent position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore modifies that action to a six-month suspension.

Additionally, the Commission orders that the appellant be granted back pay, benefits, and seniority from six-months after the first date of disciplinary separation without pay to the date he is reinstated. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. Proof of income earned, and an affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant's reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay dispute.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

DECISION RENDERED BY THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON
THE 23RD DAY OF JULY, 2025

Dolores Gorczyca

Dolores Gorczyca
Member
Civil Service Commission

Inquiries
and
Correspondence

Nicholas F. Angiulo
Director
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Attachment



State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INITIAL DECISION

OAL DKT. NO. CSV 06917-24

AGENCY DKT. NO. 2023-1653

**IN THE MATTER OF CHINWE UGORJI,
NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT.**

Ethan M. Felder, Esq., for appellant Chinwe Ugorji (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys)

Christina M. Michelson, Esq., for respondent Newark Public School District
(Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys)

Record Closed: May 22, 2025

Decided: June 16, 2025

BEFORE SUSANA E. GUERRERO, ALJ:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant, Chinwe Ugorji (Ugorji or appellant), a security guard employed by the Newark Public School District (the District or respondent), appeals his termination for failing to perform his duties on November 18, 2022.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent served the appellant with a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) dated January 4, 2023, removing him from his employment effective January 17, 2023.

The New Jersey Civil Service Commission transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on May 17, 2024, for determination as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23. The hearing was originally scheduled for October 25, 2024, but adjourned at the request of the respondent to January 13, 2025. That date was also adjourned at the request of the respondent, and the hearing ultimately took place on March 20, 2025. The parties were given an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs, and the record closed on May 22, 2025, upon receipt of the respondent's brief.

FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS OF FACT

Ugorji had been employed with the District for about twenty-five years when he was terminated in January 2023. As a security guard, his responsibilities generally included securing District-owned buildings, students, and staff across the City of Newark. Ugorji had no prior discipline.

On November 18, 2022, Ugorji was assigned to guard the District's motor pool parking lot during the evening shift, from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. He had been assigned to the motor pool for over two years. The motor pool parking lot is surrounded by a fence, with only one gated entrance on Vanderpool Street. The gate is electronically opened and closed by the security guard, and it is required to be closed at night. The motor pool contains a gas pump, a large warehouse that stores District supplies, and a small building with a window facing out to the motor pool where the security guard is stationed. The motor pool parking lot is used to store District-owned vehicles, and there were several parked in the lot on the evening of November 18, 2022.

The security guard stationed at the motor pool is responsible for guarding the vehicles in the lot. If an intruder enters the parking lot, or if there is any suspicious activity in the lot, the security guard is required to either notify the Newark Police Department or the District's security dispatch, which can then alert the Police Department of security concerns. The District's dispatch is manned twenty-four hours a day, and the District's witnesses testified credibly that security guards are required to call dispatch for coverage when he goes on a meal break, or when he is going to be away from his post for any reason. The dispatcher will then send a patrol unit to temporarily cover for that guard.

At around 2:49 a.m. on November 18, 2022, an intruder walked into the motor pool parking lot while Ugorji was on duty. Video surveillance footage taken that evening shows this intruder walking up Vanderpool Street and into the lot through the open gate. The intruder walked around the lot, past where Ugorji was stationed. He approached several District-owned vehicles, looked underneath them, and attempted to open at least one car door. He appeared to be casing the scene and looking to enter a vehicle. At around 3:05 a.m., he gained access to a District-owned pickup truck and drove it off the lot. He had been in the lot for about sixteen minutes before leaving with the stolen truck. Ugorji did not report that a vehicle had been stolen, nor did he report that a trespasser had entered the lot.

After the missing truck was discovered, Anthony Jackson (Jackson), a Board investigator who is no longer employed by the District, interviewed Ugorji on November 22, 2022, about the missing vehicle. Ugorji initially denied working the 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. shift, although this was disproven by the surveillance video showing Ugorji pumping gas at about 12:17 a.m., and the timesheets. Jackson also reported that Ugorji is not seen on surveillance performing any perimeter checks during his tour, and denied knowing that the vehicle had been stolen. Following Jackson's investigation, the matter was forwarded to Labor Relations for disciplinary action, and the District ultimately terminated Ugorji.

The District's supervisor of investigations, Jose Figueroa (Figueroa), testified credibly that the security guard is responsible for securing the location, notifying the District's dispatch that everything is secure, and undertaking patrols of the perimeter of

the lot at least every sixty minutes. Levi Holmes (Holmes), Executive Director of the Office of Safety and Security, testified credibly and consistently with Figueroa. Holmes stressed the importance of the security guard being alert and vigilant, and his responsibility to walk around and visually inspect the parking lot at least every hour. They both testified that Ugorji neglected to notify dispatch or the police that there was an intruder on the property, and that while he was not expected to physically stop the perpetrator from stealing the car, Ugorji should have, at least, made a voice command to the intruder—letting him know that he was on private property belonging to the District and telling him to leave the lot. There is a telephone located at each post where a guard is stationed, and Figueroa testified credibly that Ugorji could have used the telephone located in the motor pool to call dispatch or the police. Holmes agreed that the intruder was in the lot for an extremely long time without being noticed, and that Ugorji's actions that evening constituted a gross neglect of duty.

Ugorji was not a credible witness, and I accord little weight to his testimony. While there was an evident language barrier, Ugorji acknowledged no wrongdoing while offering no clear explanation as to what occurred that evening. He only offered excuses for his actions, or inaction, that were both uncorroborated by any evidence and unbelievable. Ugorji had no reasonable or credible explanation as to why he failed to notice and report the intruder or the stolen vehicle and only suggested that he could have been in the bathroom at the time. I **FIND** that while the record is unclear regarding where Ugorji was or what he was doing while the intruder was in the lot for about sixteen minutes, the record is clear that he was not alert, vigilant, or securing the property at the time, as required. I also **FIND** that if Ugorji was away from his post during the time the intruder was in the motor pool for about sixteen minutes, he was required, and failed, to notify dispatch.

Ugorji testified that the telephone at the motor pool's post was dead, that it had not worked for a long time, and that he was told to use his personal cell phone. He unconvincingly denied having any phone, including his own cell phone, available to him that evening. I **FIND** that Ugorji had the ability to call dispatch or the police, but he failed to make any calls to them during his shift, as required when the intruder entered the lot and later stole the truck.

Ugorji also testified that the gate to the lot stopped working due to rain and that he notified his superiors of this before the phone died. He later testified that the gate had not worked for a long time and that on November 22, 2022, he told Jackson that the phone and gate were not working. I **FIND** that the record is inconclusive as to whether the gate to the motor pool was functioning, or whether Ugorji was able to close it that evening, as he was required to do. If in fact the gate did not function, he arguably should have been even more vigilant about ensuring that intruders did not enter the lot.

While Ugorji testified that he conducted his hourly perimeter checks, he is not seen on any surveillance video conducting any perimeter check that evening. I **FIND** that Ugorji inexplicably failed to conduct the required hourly perimeter checks at the motor pool on November 18, 2022.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Public employees' rights and duties are governed and protected by the provisions of the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 12-6, and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1 to 10-3.2. However, public employees may be disciplined for a variety of offenses involving their employment, including the general causes for discipline as set forth in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a). An appointing authority may discipline an employee for sufficient cause, including failure to obey laws, rules, and regulations of the appointing authority. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).

The appellant notes in his post-hearing brief that the District failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. This, however, is the incorrect standard. In disciplinary cases, the appointing authority has the burden of both persuasion and production and must demonstrate by a preponderance of the competent, relevant, and credible evidence that it had just cause to discipline the employee and lodge the charges. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-21; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(a); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962). Evidence is said to preponderate "if it establishes 'the reasonable probability of the fact.'" Jaeger v. Elizabethtown Consol. Gas Co., 124 N.J.L. 420, 423 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (citation omitted). The evidence must "be such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to the given conclusion." Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 275 (1958).

Ugorji was charged with violating the following provisions of the New Jersey Administrative Code: N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1) (Incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties); N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) (Conduct unbecoming a public employee); N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7) (Neglect of duty); and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12) (Other sufficient cause).

The issue to be addressed here is whether a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that the appellant's actions constitute a violation of the charges set forth in the FNDA and if so, whether the violation(s) warrants termination, as proposed by the respondent, or another penalty, if any.

Ugorji asserts that the District failed to establish any neglect or misconduct warranting his discharge from service, and that the only cognizable neglect was Ugorji not knowing a vehicle was stolen. Ugorji asserts that even if he did fail to perform the perimeter checks, lock the gate, and alert dispatch, the decision to terminate his employment is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and inconsistent with the concept of progressive discipline given the fact that he has had no prior discipline for the past twenty-five and a half years.

The specific charges identified by the District in the FNDA are addressed below.

First, Ugorji is charged with violating N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1) for incompetency, inefficiency, or failure to perform his duties. In this type of breach, an employee performs his or her duties, but in a manner that exhibits insufficient quality of performance, inefficiency in the results produced, or untimeliness of performance, such that his or her performance is substandard. See Clark v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 1 N.J.A.R. 315 (1980). Based on my consideration of the testimony, my review of the surveillance videos, and my findings of fact, I **CONCLUDE** that Ugorji violated N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1) when he failed to perform his duties as a security guard on November 18, 2022, by failing to secure the motor pool parking lot. Specifically, Ugorji failed to perform his duties when he: failed to conduct the required perimeter checks of the lot; failed to notice and address the intruder who entered and walked around the lot for about sixteen minutes; failed to report

to dispatch or the police that there was a trespasser in the lot, or that there was an intruder attempting to break into District-owned vehicles; and failed to notice and report the stolen vehicle.

Second, Ugorji is charged with neglect of duty pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7). "Neglect of duty" has been interpreted to mean that an employee "neglected to perform an act required by his or her job title or was negligent in its discharge." In re Glenn, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 112 (Feb. 5, 2009) (citation omitted), adopted, Civil Serv. Comm'n (Mar. 27, 2009), <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>. The term "neglect" means a deviation from the normal standards of conduct. In re Kerlin, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 186 (App. Div. 1977). "Duty" means conformance to "the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk." Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 461 (1957) (citation omitted). Neglect of duty can arise from omitting to perform a required duty as well as from misconduct or misdoing. State v. Dunphy, 19 N.J. 531, 534 (1955). Neglect of duty does not require an intentional or willful act; however, there must be some evidence that the employee somehow breached a duty owed to the performance of the job. I **CONCLUDE** that Ugorji violated N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7) when he neglected and breached his duties as a security guard on November 18, 2022, by failing to perform the required perimeter checks of the parking lot; failing to observe, address, and report the trespasser in the lot; and failing to notice and report a truck being stolen during his shift. As a security guard for the District, Ugorji was responsible for the security of the District-owned vehicles and other property in the motor pool. As a security guard, he was not required to physically stop the intruder from trespassing, nor was he required to physically stop him from stealing the truck. He only had to be alert and vigilant, notice that the intruder was there, tell him to leave, and report that to dispatch. Not only did he neglect to notice the intruder who spent about sixteen minutes in the lot, he also neglected to notice and report that one of the District-owned trucks was missing.

I also **CONCLUDE** that, for the reasons set forth above, Ugorji's conduct also constitutes conduct unbecoming a public employee, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), as he failed to adequately perform his job duties as a security guard on November 18, 2022. "Conduct unbecoming" is an "elastic" phrase that encompasses conduct that "adversely affects the morale or efficiency of [a governmental unit] . . . [or]

which has a tendency to destroy public respect for [government] employees and confidence in the operation of [governmental] services.” Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 554 (1998) (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960)). Such misconduct need not necessarily “be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or regulation, but may be based merely upon the violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct.” Hartmann v. Police Dep’t of Ridgewood, 258 N.J. Super. 32, 40 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. at 140 (citing Asbury Park v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 17 N.J. 419, 429 (1955))).

Finally, Ugorji is charged with violating N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12), “other sufficient cause.” “Other sufficient cause” is an offense for conduct that violates the implicit standards of good behavior which devolve upon one who stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct. In re MacDonald, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 236 (May 19, 2014), adopted, Civil Serv. Comm’n (Sept. 3, 2014), <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>. I **CONCLUDE** that the respondent has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that Ugorji violated this provision of the regulation when he failed to perform his clear and basic duties as a security guard on November 18, 2022, absent any reasonable explanation.

Consequently, I **CONCLUDE** that the charges of incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties [N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1)]; conduct unbecoming a public employee [N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6)]; neglect of duty [N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7)]; and other sufficient cause [N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12)] are hereby **SUSTAINED**.

PENALTY

When dealing with the question of penalty in a de novo review of a disciplinary action against an employee, it is necessary to reevaluate the proofs and “penalty” on appeal based on the charges. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-19; Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980); W.N.Y. v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). In determining the appropriateness of a penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the employee’s offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee’s prior record. George

v. N. Princeton Developmental Ctr., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 463. Pursuant to Bock, concepts of progressive discipline involving penalties of increasing severity are used where appropriate. See In re Parlow, 192 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1983). Depending upon the incident complained of and the employee's past record, major discipline may include suspension, removal, or demotion. Bock, 38 N.J. at 522–24.

Progressive discipline may be bypassed when the misconduct is severe, when it renders the employee unsuitable for continuation in the position, or when the application of progressive discipline would be contrary to the public interest. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 33 (2007). Termination of employment is the penalty of last resort reserved for the most severe infractions or habitual negative conduct unresponsive to intervention. Rotundi v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OAL Dkt. No. CSV 00385-88, Initial Decision (Sept. 29, 1988).

Here, the District seeks to bypass progressive discipline and terminate Ugorji for the events of November 18, 2022. While I agree that the offenses here are significant in that Ugorji failed to perform his basic duties as a security guard and that this resulted in the theft of one of the District's vehicles, I am not persuaded that the misconduct here is sufficiently severe to warrant termination, particularly considering the fact that Ugorji had been employed by the District for nearly twenty-five years without any prior discipline. Consequently, I **CONCLUDE** that the penalty of termination proposed by the District is excessive, and that a long-term suspension is a more appropriate penalty. There is no evidence that Ugorji knowingly permitted the intruder access to the lot or truck, and his lengthy service to the District without any prior discipline whatsoever is also a significant consideration in determining an appropriate penalty. Given these considerations, together with the nature of the sustained charges, the absence of any reasonable explanation for failing to perform his duties, and Ugorji's refusal to take any responsibility for these failures, I **CONCLUDE** that a more appropriate penalty is a six-month suspension.

ORDER

Accordingly, it is **ORDERED** that the action of the respondent to terminate the appellant is **REVERSED**.

It is further **ORDERED** that Chinwe Ugorji be suspended for six months and that he be reinstated to his position as security guard and issued any applicable back-pay and other benefits.


I hereby **FILE** my initial decision with the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**, which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Civil Service Commission does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF APPEALS AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, UNIT H, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 44 South Clinton Avenue, PO Box 312, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312**, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

June 16, 2025

DATE



SUSANA E. GUERRERO, ALJ

Date Received at Agency:

Date Mailed to Parties:

jb

APPENDIX

Witnesses

For Appellant:

Chinwe Ugorji

For Respondent:

Jose Figueroa

Levi Andrew Holmes II

Exhibits

Joint:

J-1 PNDA

J-2 FNDA

J-3 Report from Anthony Jackson to Levi Holmes dated November 18, 2022

J-4 Memo from Angel Mercado to Ugorji dated November 22, 2022

J-5 File Code 4119.22/4219.22 – Conduct and Dress Code

J-6 Letter enclosing PNDA dated December 5, 2022

J-7 Job Specifications – Security Guard

J-8 Letter enclosing FNDA dated January 3, 2023

J-9 Memo re Employee Termination dated January 5, 2023

J-10 Google Maps Screenshots

J-11 Surveillance Video, camera 2

J-12 Surveillance Video, camera 4

J-13 Surveillance Video, camera 3

For Appellant:

None

For Respondent:

None